, the exploit began around 00:51 UTC on July 11, 2026, when a wallet identified as Wallet A submitted a price update to a third-party on-demand oracle system on the Hedera mainnet. The submitted price concerned the SAUCE\/wHBAR pair and was heavily manipulated compared to the actual market rate. Bonzo noted that this data did not reflect normal market fluctuations, as the price of SAUCE remained relatively unchanged during the same timeframe.<\/span><\/p>\nJust seconds after the incorrect price was recorded on-chain, Wallet A used a tiny amount of SAUCE as collateral to borrow assets at a scale that vastly exceeded the actual value of the collateral. In other words, the system viewed the collateral as if it were worth significantly more than its actual value, thereby triggering the <\/span>excessive borrowing<\/b>.<\/span><\/p>\nHow the Oracle Exploit Worked<\/b><\/h2>\nThe technical core of this incident lies within Oracle\u2019s <\/span>signature verification layer<\/b>. Bonzo stated that while they utilize both Supra and Chainlink on Hedera, most asset prices within the ecosystem are provided by Supra using a \u201cpush\u201d model. Simply put, Supra\u2019s oracle committee signs and pushes prices on-chain, while Bonzo Lend merely reads the stored data to calculate the value of collateral and loans.<\/span><\/p>\nBonzo clarified that no valid oracle signatures were forged, and the actual market price of SAUCE did not fluctuate significantly enough to explain the divergence seen on-chain. Instead, the contract verifier accepted an invalid submission because a critical security check was not properly executed.<\/span><\/p>\nAccording to the latest report, the data submitted by <\/span>Wallet A <\/b>to the oracle contract included a committee ID, a committee hash, and a <\/span>zeroed-out signature<\/b>. A proper verifier should have blocked this at the very first step, even before the pairing check. However, in this case, the system passed the data into the BLS pairing check on the Hedera precompile. Because both the signature point and the referenced public key were zeroed out, the pairing check returned true based on the mathematical logic of the provided input, resulting in a validation that was incorrect in context.<\/span><\/p>\nBonzo also emphasized that this was not a flash-loan attack, nor was it market manipulation in the conventional sense, and it was not caused by a bug in Bonzo Lend\u2019s core contracts.<\/span><\/p>\n
![\"Bonzo\u2019s](\"https:\/\/nftplazas.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/Screenshot-2026-07-13-at-00.34.30.png\")